US assistance in developing tech infrastructure could help achieve Washington’s strategic and diplomatic goals by countering Russia and China
US assistance in developing tech infrastructure could help achieve
Washington’s strategic and diplomatic goals by countering Russia and China
JOSEPH B. JELLER
Submarine fiber-optic cables traversing oceans and connecting the African continent have
fast emerged as a geopolitical hotspot for the West.
As of late, United States foreign policy has been captivated by strategic maneuvering in response to China’s surveillance balloon and plans to implement a national ban on the world’s most popular app, TikTok, which has ties to Beijing.
Meanwhile, as extensive plans to expand cable networks are being executed by coalitions of investors and international partners, the West cannot lose sight of other looming national security risks as undersea cables and other information and communications technologies (ICT) in Africa now function as
modern pressure points for authoritarian regimes to supplant Western influence and secure competitive advantages.
The continent is experiencing the most rapid growth of international bandwidth on the planet, and accelerated construction of African subsea cables gives significant leverage to China while creating a
security vulnerability due to the risk of Russian meddling. The West would be mistaken to overlook the implications of African submarine cable proliferation for modern geopolitical strategies between global powers.
Submerged beneath the sea, these small tubes of glass and light hold the promise of facilitating greater internet access
across Africa, enhancing connection among the continent’s people and to the rest of the world, and linking a budding network of data centers and digital infrastructure. Reliable internet connectivity is a crucial component of artificial intelligence (AI) applications, and Africa has captured substantial investment from private industry titans, including
Google and Meta, to digitise some of world’s least-connected countries.
Global reliance on subsea cable systems accompanies heightened demand and the growth of cloud computing, extending the power of Beijing’s hegemonic foothold on the continent (thanks to Chinese debt financing and infrastructure
construction) and providing Moscow a target for spying, tapping, or cyberattacks—causing direct or indirect physical harm through the exploitation of digital systems and processes—in its bid to antagonise the United States and its Western allies.
There are upward of 552 active or planned
submarine cables transmitting more than 95 percent of global telecommunications traffic across Africa, Europe, and the Americas. They serve as crucial ICT infrastructure tucked mostly out of sight—encircling the African continent like a cocoon.
For more than 20 years, cables have enabled digital connection in
Africa, spanning a burgeoning undersea network system along the coastline, comprised of 72 cables active or under construction. These cables can improve internet speeds, connect remote communities, and advance economic progress while supporting various machine learning and AI applications. Despite the immense cost,
these undertakings are a necessary means to an end. African leaders expect to justify this venture by creating a skilled labor force, sparking economic growth, and not allowing the continent to be left behind in this next iteration of digital transformation.
This technological
revolution has gone hand in hand with Africa’s deepening relationship with China, which has risen since the 1990s to a consequential position in the global fiber-optic cable sector beyond the Pacific. Investments in Africa have become a significant pillar of Beijing’s foreign-policy agenda. Chinese leaders recognize these technologies are
instrumental for delivering their tech products and influence throughout the world.
China’s techno-diplomacy on the African continent goes well beyond the standard construction of bridges, roads, and ports—its bond is focused on touting AI, internet connectivity, and cloud computing possibilities.
For years, China has been manufacturing and sharing ICT assets—including data centers, semiconductors, and other key technologies, particularly those enabling surveillance—with African nations.
Beijing has been the primary financier of Africa’s digital revolution. Chinese companies and
banks support two notable subsea cable projects on the continent.
Indeed, Beijing has been the primary financier of Africa’s digital revolution. Chinese companies and banks support two notable subsea cable projects on the continent, including one of the largest in the world, with numerous landing sites
across several countries. This aid is undoubtedly transformative, but insurmountable debt may compromise those on the receiving end; debt-trap diplomacy means countries can’t pay back loans or projects may never get completed. Beijing’s funding of African cables affords it disproportionate control of its operations and may
nurture growing economic dependence—it foreshadows important discussions regarding data privacy and sovereignty.
Frequent recipients of Chinese investment have much in common; however, partnership terms often arrive in opaque packaging and may come
with a hefty price. Loans through Chinese banks lack transparency. International observers are concerned lending terms can be coupled with higher rates and shorter repayment windows than more traditional multilateral development banks, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
Burdened by debt and
fiscal capacity challenges, African countries also face steeper borrowing rates than other countries with similar risk profiles. The United States remains a vocal critic of development loans of this type because destructive debt can ultimately stifle forward progress. But it’s unclear if Washington can counter with a better alternative.
China’s new foreign minister visited Africa in January, depicting Beijing as a willing and trusted commercial partner. Given historically lackluster economic injections from the West as well as immediate needs, many African countries will not unnecessarily hinder tech endeavors by implementing heavy-
handed regulatory processes that might curb societal advances. Most countries understandably prioritise ICT infrastructure with urgency. Nevertheless, complete acquiescence to Beijing’s terms and financial support threatens to restrict African agency and autonomy in the future.
Leaders around the globe
are beginning to acknowledge the vulnerability of undersea cables. Although most threats are primarily environmental or accidental, speculations flourish about fiber-optic cables as potential targets of sabotage, and both industry leaders and policymakers express mounting concern about deliberate attacks on vital
cables.
Many scholars have explored the danger to cables in warfare; although some circumstances appear overblown, others appear severely underplayed. Yet the potential for military exploitation has not entirely receded whether malign actors are on the doorstep of major conflict
or not. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak knows all too well about the vulnerability of cables in the Atlantic Ocean to adversaries like Russia.
As a member of Parliament years ago, he noted there was a growing risk of attacks on subsea cables, specifically from Russia, declaring it an existential threat to United
Kingdom national security. He issued something akin to a rallying cry for cooperation, writing, “Working with global partners it is crucial that we act now to protect against these dangers, ensuring that our century’s greatest innovation does not also become its undoing.”
As the most proficient seabed
operator in the world, Russia’s military and naval capabilities have enormous capacity to engage in combat and espionage across the ocean floor.
As the most proficient seabed operator in the world, Russia’s military and naval capabilities have enormous capacity
to engage in combat and espionage across the ocean floor—they remain a pervasive threat to African undersea cables. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine amplified security concerns among Nato leaders. They can deploy their Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, which has been gathering expertise and generating technologies optimised
for seabed warfare for years. Russia has monitored UK subsea cables during the war with Ukraine, a formidable demonstration of cyberwarfare.
Although Moscow may not devastate the West’s entire internet, purposeful movements to impair select adversaries are possible. The Nord Stream
gas pipelines explosions aroused suspicion of sabotage—although attribution remains unclear—and elevated the security issues of seabed infrastructure and cyber-physical systems in general.
Russian President Vladimir Putin comprehends the power of such disruption, and
Russia’s naval strength has significant reach beyond its shores. China and Russia are the two largest sponsors of cyberoperations that could impact cables, and they are highly effective at manipulating networks to police internet voices. A military synergy between the two draws ever closer.
As the three global superpowers conver
ge on Africa, tensions may boil over into confrontation. The United States has become increasingly worried about losing valuable rapport with the African continent; however, struggling efforts to repair a languishing relationship have been impeded by missteps. But the larger concern is that long-term economic
influence from China may translate to political leverage on the African continent.
The impetus for the recent US-Africa Leaders Summit last December, in part, was to rebuild and reinforce ties that may have been weakened under the Trump administration. The summit convened to much fanfare with the
declaration of numerous commitments and promises, but the true success of the engagement will emerge in the aftermath.
African nations have exercised independence in the global arena, but they still find themselves in a frustrating middle ground in these scenarios. The West’s new posture and
earnest overtures toward the African continent recognizes the considerable relevance of its culture to the African diaspora—but also the economic potential linked to high-grade deposits of rare earth minerals and extensive population growth, with the 10 countries with the most youthful demographics in the world being located in
Africa. They are key to the future of emerging technologies. Ultimately, the fatigue inherent to being seen as a pawn while existing as a stage for geopolitical competition can cultivate resentment.
China’s intensifying presence and the potential cyber and physical threat that Russia poses to subsea cables fulfill
broader desires to displace the liberal influence of the United States and its allies on Africa as well as threaten the security and reliability of global communications. If Western leaders intend to limit authoritarian forces as they endeavor to tip the scales of the global digital ecosystem, then they must engage with these issues swiftly in the
region. The stakes are high.
The United States and the European Union both acknowledge increasing risks for critical internet infrastructure and maintain support for secure and robust connectivity with partner countries, some now on the African continent. At the same time,
Washington and the West lament ceding ground and depth in Africa.
The West would be wise to foreground these emerging geopolitical conflicts and closely scrutinise Russia and China’s engagement around subsea cables in Africa to shield its own economic and political interests as well as maintain the security of
global communications.
Authoritarian and state-sponsored actors may attempt to surreptitiously reshape the global digital network—to the detriment of Africans. At a moment when the planning and construction of undersea cables accompany surging ICT infrastructure on the continent, it is essential that Western governments
account for these escalating hazards. The next chapter should begin with greater investments in Africa’s digital future.
In collaboration with Africans, Western governments could demonstrate their commitments to empowerment and equal partnership with undersea cable management and
construction while uniting around cutting-edge training and educational opportunities as well as incentivising a productive alliance toward prosperity and technological self-determination.
ICT infrastructure lies at the heart of this mission. It would also behoove the United States and its allies to ensure African
stakeholders are equipped with robust security measures, best practices in submarine cable resilience, and mutually beneficial intelligence.
About the writer: Joseph B. Keller is a cognitive scientist and visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in the United States.–Foreign Policy.
Submarine fiber-optic cables traversing oceans and connecting the African continent have fast emerged as a geopolitical hotspot for the West.
As of late, United States foreign policy has been captivated by strategic maneuvering in response to China’s surveillance balloon and plans to implement a national ban on the world’s most popular app, TikTok, which has ties to Beijing.
Meanwhile, as extensive plans to expand cable networks are being executed by coalitions of investors and international partners, the West cannot lose sight of other looming national security risks as undersea cables and other information and communications technologies (ICT) in Africa now function as modern pressure points for authoritarian regimes to supplant Western influence and secure competitive advantages.
The continent is experiencing the most rapid growth of international bandwidth on the planet, and accelerated construction of African subsea cables gives significant leverage to China while creating a security vulnerability due to the risk of Russian meddling. The West would be mistaken to overlook the implications of African submarine cable proliferation for modern geopolitical strategies between global powers.
Submerged beneath the sea, these small tubes of glass and light hold the promise of facilitating greater internet access across Africa, enhancing connection among the continent’s people and to the rest of the world, and linking a budding network of data centers and digital infrastructure. Reliable internet connectivity is a crucial component of artificial intelligence (AI) applications, and Africa has captured substantial investment from private industry titans, including Google and Meta, to digitise some of world’s least-connected countries.
Global reliance on subsea cable systems accompanies heightened demand and the growth of cloud computing, extending the power of Beijing’s hegemonic foothold on the continent (thanks to Chinese debt financing and infrastructure construction) and providing Moscow a target for spying, tapping, or cyberattacks—causing direct or indirect physical harm through the exploitation of digital systems and processes—in its bid to antagonise the United States and its Western allies.
There are upward of 552 active or planned submarine cables transmitting more than 95 percent of global telecommunications traffic across Africa, Europe, and the Americas. They serve as crucial ICT infrastructure tucked mostly out of sight—encircling the African continent like a cocoon.
For more than 20 years, cables have enabled digital connection in Africa, spanning a burgeoning undersea network system along the coastline, comprised of 72 cables active or under construction. These cables can improve internet speeds, connect remote communities, and advance economic progress while supporting various machine learning and AI applications. Despite the immense cost, these undertakings are a necessary means to an end. African leaders expect to justify this venture by creating a skilled labor force, sparking economic growth, and not allowing the continent to be left behind in this next iteration of digital transformation.
This technological revolution has gone hand in hand with Africa’s deepening relationship with China, which has risen since the 1990s to a consequential position in the global fiber-optic cable sector beyond the Pacific. Investments in Africa have become a significant pillar of Beijing’s foreign-policy agenda. Chinese leaders recognize these technologies are instrumental for delivering their tech products and influence throughout the world.
China’s techno-diplomacy on the African continent goes well beyond the standard construction of bridges, roads, and ports—its bond is focused on touting AI, internet connectivity, and cloud computing possibilities.
For years, China has been manufacturing and sharing ICT assets—including data centers, semiconductors, and other key technologies, particularly those enabling surveillance—with African nations.
Beijing has been the primary financier of Africa’s digital revolution. Chinese companies and banks support two notable subsea cable projects on the continent.
Indeed, Beijing has been the primary financier of Africa’s digital revolution. Chinese companies and banks support two notable subsea cable projects on the continent, including one of the largest in the world, with numerous landing sites across several countries. This aid is undoubtedly transformative, but insurmountable debt may compromise those on the receiving end; debt-trap diplomacy means countries can’t pay back loans or projects may never get completed. Beijing’s funding of African cables affords it disproportionate control of its operations and may nurture growing economic dependence—it foreshadows important discussions regarding data privacy and sovereignty.
Frequent recipients of Chinese investment have much in common; however, partnership terms often arrive in opaque packaging and may come with a hefty price. Loans through Chinese banks lack transparency. International observers are concerned lending terms can be coupled with higher rates and shorter repayment windows than more traditional multilateral development banks, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.
Burdened by debt and fiscal capacity challenges, African countries also face steeper borrowing rates than other countries with similar risk profiles. The United States remains a vocal critic of development loans of this type because destructive debt can ultimately stifle forward progress. But it’s unclear if Washington can counter with a better alternative.
China’s new foreign minister visited Africa in January, depicting Beijing as a willing and trusted commercial partner. Given historically lackluster economic injections from the West as well as immediate needs, many African countries will not unnecessarily hinder tech endeavors by implementing heavy-handed regulatory processes that might curb societal advances. Most countries understandably prioritise ICT infrastructure with urgency. Nevertheless, complete acquiescence to Beijing’s terms and financial support threatens to restrict African agency and autonomy in the future.
Leaders around the globe are beginning to acknowledge the vulnerability of undersea cables. Although most threats are primarily environmental or accidental, speculations flourish about fiber-optic cables as potential targets of sabotage, and both industry leaders and policymakers express mounting concern about deliberate attacks on vital cables.
Many scholars have explored the danger to cables in warfare; although some circumstances appear overblown, others appear severely underplayed. Yet the potential for military exploitation has not entirely receded whether malign actors are on the doorstep of major conflict or not. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak knows all too well about the vulnerability of cables in the Atlantic Ocean to adversaries like Russia.
As a member of Parliament years ago, he noted there was a growing risk of attacks on subsea cables, specifically from Russia, declaring it an existential threat to United
Kingdom national security. He issued something akin to a rallying cry for cooperation, writing, “Working with global partners it is crucial that we act now to protect against these dangers, ensuring that our century’s greatest innovation does not also become its undoing.”
As the most proficient seabed operator in the world, Russia’s military and naval capabilities have enormous capacity to engage in combat and espionage across the ocean floor.
As the most proficient seabed operator in the world, Russia’s military and naval capabilities have enormous capacity to engage in combat and espionage across the ocean floor—they remain a pervasive threat to African undersea cables. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine amplified security concerns among Nato leaders. They can deploy their Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, which has been gathering expertise and generating technologies optimised for seabed warfare for years. Russia has monitored UK subsea cables during the war with Ukraine, a formidable demonstration of cyberwarfare.
Although Moscow may not devastate the West’s entire internet, purposeful movements to impair select adversaries are possible. The Nord Stream gas pipelines explosions aroused suspicion of sabotage—although attribution remains unclear—and elevated the security issues of seabed infrastructure and cyber-physical systems in general.
Russian President Vladimir Putin comprehends the power of such disruption, and Russia’s naval strength has significant reach beyond its shores. China and Russia are the two largest sponsors of cyberoperations that could impact cables, and they are highly effective at manipulating networks to police internet voices. A military synergy between the two draws ever closer.
As the three global superpowers converge on Africa, tensions may boil over into confrontation. The United States has become increasingly worried about losing valuable rapport with the African continent; however, struggling efforts to repair a languishing relationship have been impeded by missteps. But the larger concern is that long-term economic influence from China may translate to political leverage on the African continent.
The impetus for the recent US-Africa Leaders Summit last December, in part, was to rebuild and reinforce ties that may have been weakened under the Trump administration. The summit convened to much fanfare with the declaration of numerous commitments and promises, but the true success of the engagement will emerge in the aftermath.
African nations have exercised independence in the global arena, but they still find themselves in a frustrating middle ground in these scenarios. The West’s new posture and earnest overtures toward the African continent recognizes the considerable relevance of its culture to the African diaspora—but also the economic potential linked to high-grade deposits of rare earth minerals and extensive population growth, with the 10 countries with the most youthful demographics in the world being located in Africa. They are key to the future of emerging technologies. Ultimately, the fatigue inherent to being seen as a pawn while existing as a stage for geopolitical competition can cultivate resentment.
China’s intensifying presence and the potential cyber and physical threat that Russia poses to subsea cables fulfill broader desires to displace the liberal influence of the United States and its allies on Africa as well as threaten the security and reliability of global communications. If Western leaders intend to limit authoritarian forces as they endeavor to tip the scales of the global digital ecosystem, then they must engage with these issues swiftly in the region. The stakes are high.
The United States and the European Union both acknowledge increasing risks for critical internet infrastructure and maintain support for secure and robust connectivity with partner countries, some now on the African continent. At the same time, Washington and the West lament ceding ground and depth in Africa.
The West would be wise to foreground these emerging geopolitical conflicts and closely scrutinise Russia and China’s engagement around subsea cables in Africa to shield its own economic and political interests as well as maintain the security of global communications.
Authoritarian and state-sponsored actors may attempt to surreptitiously reshape the global digital network—to the detriment of Africans. At a moment when the planning and construction of undersea cables accompany surging ICT infrastructure on the continent, it is essential that Western governments account for these escalating hazards. The next chapter should begin with greater investments in Africa’s digital future.
In collaboration with Africans, Western governments could demonstrate their commitments to empowerment and equal partnership with undersea cable management and construction while uniting around cutting-edge training and educational opportunities as well as incentivising a productive alliance toward prosperity and technological self-determination.
ICT infrastructure lies at the heart of this mission. It would also behoove the United States and its allies to ensure African stakeholders are equipped with robust security measures, best practices in submarine cable resilience, and mutually beneficial intelligence.
About the writer: Joseph B. Keller is a cognitive scientist and visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in the United States.–Foreign Policy.
