How Bonyongwe navigated coup as Mugabe was toppled

DUMISANI MULEYA

ZIMBABWE’S Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) former Director-General Happyton Bonyongwe says he found himself in the eye of a raging storm during the precarious November 2017 military coup which ousted the late ex-president Robert Mugabe, propelling President Emmerson Mnangagwa to power.

In a gripping narrative in his memoirs, titled One Among Many: My contribution to the Zimbabwean story, Bonyongwe, who served at CIO for 19 years, tells how he had to strike a delicate balance between personal safety issues, self-preservation, duty and loyalty, political brinkmanship and manoeuvring and national interest and stability

throughout the spine-chilling period of the coup amid tensions, fear and uncertainty.

The former CIO boss and minister narrates the story with a fresh chronicle of mostly publicly well-known events leading to the coup, but threads personal experiences and new details in a cautiously revealing account as the key contact person between Mugabe, Zimbabwe Defence Forces commanders, mediators, bureaucrats, and intelligence operatives delicately trying to manage the perilous transition during the coup.

The interregnum was volatile, characterised by danger and uncertainty. Bonyongwe carried a lot of weight of the coup situation on his shoulders as he was Justice minister — many constitutional and legal issues were involved — CIO boss for 19 years, a retired military commander after 18 years and a war veteran who was close to Mugabe and the coup-plotters.

Besides, he was a lawyer whose skills were significantly needed at the time.

During his long and dramatic career in the public service, Bonyongwe had worked with the military commanders behind the coup for years.

Some of them had come a long way with him from the liberation struggle days. By virtue

of his previous position as head of CIO, four years as deputy director-general and 15 as director-general, he had interacted with different politicians and broker powers over the years.

Bonyongwe, who states he likes operating in the shadows, says in his liaisons through phone calls, meetings and briefings, his mission was not to rescue Mugabe as military commanders and the Zanu PF faction led by Mnangagwa thought, and almost crucified him for that.

Bonyongwe’s main agenda was to salvage his own situation for self-preservation and ensure the coup stand-off was resolved peacefully without bloodshed to allow the nation to move forward from Mugabe rule to a new era, he says.

He was also motivated by the need not to be seen as a stumbling block to the coup and someone against change.

So he ensured that he facilitated various processes and meetings involved from a neutral position as humanly possible as he could despite that he was seen as a G40 faction bigwig, something which he vehemently denies.

He even denies that he was with the late retired General Solomon Mujuru’s Zanu PF fac

tion, posturing as neutral.

Capturing the build-up to the coup from the context of Zanu PF factionalism, infighting and youth interface rallies, as well as the succession battle against a backdrop of various attempts to persuade Mugabe to fix the problem before it exploded in his face, Bonyongwe says when Vice President Constantino Chiwenga returned from an official visit in China, a series of events that followed would trigger a coup that he thinks was not well-organised and coordinated.

When Chiwenga arrived in Harare on 12 November 2017, he was whisked away from the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport by “army special forces” to prevent his arrest by police.

It is important to note that former police commissioner-general Augustine Chihuri denied during the first meeting between army commanders and Mugabe at State House on 16 November that police had a plan to arrest Chiwenga.

When Mugabe refused to meet military commanders on 13 November 2017 — which was perhaps the turning point — they then spent the whole day at KGVI (Josiah Magama Tongogara) Barracks plotting the next course of action.

In the evening, they called a press conference and issued a statement making a raft of demands bordering on threat on a coup. Operation Restore Legacy, the official code-name of the coup, was now in motion and the situation was touchand-go.

The following day, 14 November 2017, there was a cabinet meeting which did not even discuss the issue, an indication of Mugabe’s hubris and arrogance of power.

Only the then Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko had referred to it, saying the situation was serious and if it were in other countries cabinet ministers would have been seized by the army, but that would never happen in Zimbabwe.

Mphoko, just like Mugabe and others, naively believed a coup would not happen in the country.

Mugabe was to tell journalists in an interview in March 2018 that he never thought Mnangagwa and Chiwenga would go that far, which by all indications they did not want to, but were forced by events. As the cabinet meeting progressed, photos of personal armoured carriers — not tanks — started filtering on social media.

They were coming from Special Forces’ Inkomo Barracks and rolling into town.

Sensing danger and panicking, Bonyongwe called his lifelong friend Air Force commander Air Marshal Perence Shiri, but he did not answer initially.

A few minutes later, Shiri called back and during the conversation about the army move ments, he said he did not know anything as he was in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, attending an air show.

Shiri did not comment on Bonyongwe’s enquiry on the army deployment and the call ended on that note.

From there, Bonyongwe went on to see Mugabe to discuss his CIO terminal benefits and when he arrived there, four ministers — Sydney Sekeramayi, Ignatius Chombo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Simon Khaya Moyo — were leaving the President’s Office.

When the meeting between Mugabe and him was over, the President then asked Bonyongwe what he thought about the developing situation.

The former CIO boss said the Justice ministry had looked into the issue and was thinking of seeking a declaratory order by the courts to prevent the army from dabbling into politics and doing what they were up.

The ministry was not preferring charges on the coup-plotters, but trying to stop the military from interfering in national political affairs in violation of the constitution.

However, Bonyongwe admits him and his officials were naive to think they could stop a coup through a court order.

Mugabe then said what Bonyongwe was thinking of doing fell short of what was needed

to tackle the situation. What was happening, Mugabe said, was that army commanders had committed treason and that should be appropriately addressed.

As a result, Mugabe then dispatched Khaya Moyo, the Zanu PF spokesperson, that evening to issue a statement, denouncing the commanders and warning they had committed treason.

Instead of frightening the command element, the statement made them more aggressive and agitated.

For they knew that they had crossed the Rubicon and would be charged with treason if the coup failed.

Desperate for a solution, Mugabe was already manoeuvring to get Mariyawanda Nzuwah,

Public Service Commission chair, to fire Chiwenga.

Bonyongwe asked Mugabe who would then take charge if Chiwenga was fired. Mugabe said Shiri. Bonyongwe replied that he had spoken to Shiri and he said he was in Dubai.

Mugabe then tasked Bonyongwe to look for Shiri to offer the position to replace Chiwenga as Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander and to quash the coup.

From seeing Mugabe, Bonyongwe went to the Justice ministry and put together a legal opinion on the issue and sent it to permanent secretary Virginia Mabhiza.

From there, he went and later tried to call Shiri but he did not find him. Bonyongwe then sent Shiri a short message: “Come home”.There was no reply. Bonyongwe then went to sleep, calm before the storm.

“I was woken up by a call from Mugabe around 1am (in the early hours of 15 November 2017), but I had been fast asleep, it took a little while before the ring tone woke me up. Mugabe advised me that the army had gone to Chombo, Kasukuwere and (Jonathan) Moyo’s homes and caused some damage. The former had been arrested, but Moyo and Kasukuwere had arrived at the Blue Roof, the President’s residence. The army was at the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation in Highlands. He wanted to know if I was safe. I had told him I was and that was the end of the conversation,” Bonyongwe writes.

“I then discussed the situation with my wife (Willia) and decided to see what else I could find out, and I called the Acting DG CIO, Aaron Nhepera, who confirmed that a coup d’etat was underway. We did not discuss anything further.

I thanked God for sending me to the Ministry of Justice before the coup took place.”

Bonyongwe said things got worse when his former colleagues like Albert Ngulube, former Director Security, were attacked and Peter Munetsi died in the process.

Later Nhepera called Bonyongwe to ask if Mugabe should be moved to a safe house, but the former CIO chief said it was better from a security perspective if he remained at Blue Roof.

Playing hide-and-seek with the army would be dangerous for him, he advised.

Bonyongwe wonders whether that advise did not unwittingly help the coup because for the putsch to succeed Mugabe had to be detained, exiled or assassinated.

That is how coups are usually executed. So advising that Mugabe should remain at house amounted to putting him under house arrest and worsening his vulnerability, a better option from him, but aiding and abetting the coup all the same.

To make his point, Bonyongwe refers to how Turkish President Recep Erdogan survived a coup in 2016 and launched a fierce counter to illustrate the issue.

On 15 July 2016, a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces, organised as the Peace at Home Council attempted a coup Erdogan.

They attempted to seize control of several places, Ankara, Istanbul and Marmaris and elsewhere, such as the Asian side entrance of the Bosphorus Bridge, but failed after security forces and civilians loyal to the state defeated them.

Bonyongwe says: “The reasons for the coup against Mugabe which I discussed earlier (succession issues), such as demonisation of Mugabe, and his lack of popular public support at the time of the coup, his advanced age, and the impact of military power, prevented him from successfully launching an counter as Erdogan did in 2016 in Turkey…

Had Mugabe been 10 or more years younger, no coup would have taken place in Zimbabwe.

“Returing to the early morning of 15 November 2017, Mugabe had mentioned that soldiers had gone to ZBC.”

Since he did not have a television set at home as he was settling into a new house, Bonyongwe left his wife at home and went to his sister-inlaw in Vainona, Harare, to watch the drama as it unfolded.

Bonyongwe says his sister-in-law’s son Simba played him a message from a man saying he had spoken to former army colonel Lionel Dyck who told him that he had been in touch with Zimbabwe National Army commander Lieutenant-General Philip Valerio Sibanda who confirmed the military had taken over.

“Then the television flickered on and on came Major-General SB Moyo and Air Commodore Nzvede, and SB made the now well-known statement…,” Bonyongwe says.

The following morning after the coup, 15 November 2017, Bonyongwe says he went to work and met his Justice ministry staff led by Dr Runganga Gumbo as usual.

“We discussed the situation and concluded that the coup was the result of the cumulative impact of a series of events, some of which were accidental, like the failure by the president to meet commanders on Monday, 13 November 2017.”

Bonyongwe says while personal armoured carriers had been deployed to the streets, locking traffic, the coup did not look like it was properly coordinated.

“The execution of the coup, particularly the vehicle deployments throughout the previous day, did not indicate a well-planned military operation, one executed with precision (usually in the dead of the night, so that people wake up to a fait accompli).”

The army moved slowly and laboriously to strategic positions hoping Mugabe would see the looming danger and move quickly to address the crisis, which he did not do, the ex-CIO boss says.

“From a military stand point, the slow deployment speed would have given anyone serious about a counter option time to act. This would have included assembling help from outside,” he says.

Bonyongwe says there was no need for outside intervention to stop the coup because that was an internal Zanu PF succession conflict, a view Mugabe was to later tell South African mediators led by Defence Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula sent to Harare by President Jacob Zuma who was also Southern African Development Community chair.

Mugabe met with army commanders and the South African envoys on 16 November 2017 at State House.

Zuma had spoken to him the day before checking if he was fine, to which Mugabe said he was, although under house arrest.

Bonyongwe says: “My view was that these events related to the succession issue, and Zanu PF factionalism, which was now at a peak; so it was for Zimbabweans alone, and particularly Mugabe and generals, to solve the problems.”

He says how Mugabe and his Zanu PF functionaries had reacted to the generals’ statement had forced them to cross the Rubicon, with no chance of going back.

Yet all along Mugabe remained hopeful the situation could be reversed, especially as generals continued to allow him to be symbolically in charge and engage him.

It later transpired that Mugabe spoke to Mnangagwa when he was in South Africa in self-imposed exile and asked him to return for them to find a solution to the crisis.

Mnangagwa wanted to come back to talk to Mugabe about the situation and fix it, but his political allies on the ground refused.

Meanwhile, on the morning of 15 November 2017, the generals had constituted a negotiating team, showing they did not want to go for broke against Mugabe.

They wanted a negotiated political settlement. The negotiating team comprised Acting CIO boss Nhepera, cleric Father Fidelis Mukonori, and Mugabe spokesperson George Charamba, who had already crossed the floor to coup-plotters.

They were later to be complimented by former Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor Gideon Gono, who had good relations with Mugabe and the generals, especially Chiwenga.

In the process, the commanders summoned Chief Secretary to the President and Cabinet Misheck Sibanda and Nzuwah to the barracks to order them to ensure normalcy in state institutions and government departments, particularly the civil service.

On 16 November, Bonyongwe went to Munhumutapa Building to chair a meeting of the cabinet committee on legislation, his first time doing so.

The meeting failed to take place due to disruptions of state operations and defections from Mugabe to Mnangagwa.

Fortuitously, Bonyongwe met permanent secretary in the War Veterans ministry retired Brigadier-General Walter Tapfumaneyi, who had worked with him in the army and CIO.

The day before, 15 November, Tapfumaneyi had met commanders at the barracks.

So he advised Bonyongwe of the fears and hostilities expressed at the barracks, which posed a grave security risk to him.

The commanders feared that Mugabe was working with Bonyongwe and others to organise a counter, which was untrue, according to the author.

The encounter was useful for Bonyongwe because he then got to know what the commanders were thinking of him at the height of tensions between the army and CIO.

Bonyongwe expressed his wish to meet Chiwenga, which he later did. He kept in touch and worked with Sibanda on a regular basis in a bid to manage the situation.

On 17 November, a meeting was held at the Justice ministry, attended by Mabhiza, Justice Rita Makarau, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission chair at the time, Attorney-General Prince Machaya, Elasto Mugwadi, Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission chair, and retired Major-General Paradzai Zimondi, head of the Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services.

Prosecutor-General Ray Goba did not attend as he had been removed.

“During that meeting, I outlined the situation as I saw it: the coup had come about due to the situation in the party and government (i.e succession, which I did not specifically mention by name but of which everyone was aware of), while the trigger had been accidental,” Bonyongwe says.

Zimondi, a veteran of the liberation struggle, had been in Mozambique when the coup started, and he was relieved the meeting had gone well as he did not know how would have unfolded.

Makarau asked if the constitution had been suspended, to which Bonyongwe said no.

Throughout the coup, the army did not suspend the constitution or impose a state of emergency and martial law.

“Meanwhile, after the meeting, I received a call that I was wanted at the Blue Roof. I realised that this would be a challenge as the army was deployed around the President’s residence.

I called Brigadier-General Tapfumaneyi and advised him to inform CDF (Chiwenga) about the request. He did so and the CDF then asked to speak to me, asking why I needed permission of the army to go and meet my principal — the president; I was a minister.

I could go and see the President as I pleased,” Bonyongwe says. After getting Chiwenga’s clearance, Bonyongwe went to see Mugabe, but found him not at home.

He had gone to Rainbow Towers Hotel for the Zimbabwe Open University graduation ceremony.

“So we waited for him with Grace Mugabe and her sister Shuvai Gumbochuma. Mugabe arrived soon afterwards. I advised him that the generals knew that I had come to see him; this drew attention to the fact that power was slipping away from him as my presence at his house had to be sanctioned elsewhere. He wanted to know what I knew and me to give him an assessment of whether the situation could be resolved in his favour. He was also worried about reports that demonstrators wanted to move to his house,” he says.

Bonyongwe admits he did not have much information at that moment and could not advise Mugabe as a result. As Bonyongwe was leaving Mugabe’s house,

he met Kasukuwere and Moyo who were hiding at Blue Roof since the army had raided them with their families on the night of the coup at the farmer’s house.

“I felt sad because Robert Mugabe was losing power ungracefully and all indications were that even the region was abandoning him. There did not appear to be any help for him from anywhere,” Bonyongwe notes.

From that Bonyongwe shifts his attention to the protests that were being organised to force out Mugabe amid threats that demonstrators could invade his house, something which later they tried, but got stopped by the army.

“On the morning of 18 November, the city centre was full of demonstrators. People from all walks of life and all races, as well as the youths who had seen their economic fortunes decline over the years. Such scenes in Harare were unprecedented,” he adds.

“Public opinion in Harare was clearly against Mugabe, with everyone saying that he had to go. He had left it too late to leave with dignity.”

The following day, 19 November, Bonyongwe met Mugabe at State House to assess the crisis as the situation deteriorated.

Mugabe, refusing to accept reality, said demonstrators on the streets were not representative of Zimbabweans as they were only MDC supporters in Harare.

Bonyongwe says that was not true as there were Zanu PF supporters involved and the army played a huge role on mobilising protesters behind the scenes, even allowing them to climb on personal armoured carriers to pose for photos and to chant slogans.

After that, Bonyongwe wanted to retreat to his farm briefly to reset, but changed his mind as the army was deployed on the roads, which could expose him to security risks.

He then called Tapfumaneyi and asked to meet Chiwenga and the other commanders. A

meeting between Chiwenga, Sibanda and Brigadier-General Grey Mashava, Chiwenga’s personal assistant, was arranged.

As they were meeting, anti-status quo demonstrators started moving in the direction of Mugabe’s house, something which the late autocrat feared the most.

Despite his authoritarian repression and obduracy, Mugabe feared the people.

As people advanced, Mugabe called Chiwenga, the army commander, in panic to stop the demonstrators in their tracks.

Interestingly, Bonyongwe then learnt from Chiwenga that Gono had been to the barracks

sent by Mugabe the night before to discuss the deadlock and how to break it.

Mugabe sent Gono to offer Chiwenga to take over and not defer to Mnangagwa, but the army commander rejected that “absurd offer”.

Mugabe sent Gono because he believed that Mukonori was no longer impartial, he was to later tell journalists. Chiwenga also told Bonyongwe that he had received a call from a Congolese business executive Kalaa Mpinga, who had business interests in Zimbabwe, saying he was acting on behalf of Kasukuwere who wanted to know how he as a member of the opposing side, G40, could help to end the crisis.

Apparently, Kasukuwere wanted to know  what it would take to end the coup siege. Chiwenga said he could not understand what that was all about, and hence did not take it up.

Before Bonyongwe left, he asked to speak to Chiwenga privately, which they did.

He told Chiwenga that Tapfumaneyi had indicated to him that the generals were concerned that he wanted to counter the coup.

That issue dominated the whole drama. Bonyongwe assured Chiwenga there was no such thing, clearing the air.

But before that Chiwenga said Tapfumaneyi should not have told him about it.

Bonyongwe then told Chiwenga that he had received some calls from Equatorial Guinea and Botswana concerned about the situation.

Mugabe had in 2004 saved Equatorial Guinea President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo from a coup plot by the Simon Mann-led band of mercenaries.

Now Nguema wanted to know if there was anything he could do for Mugabe; payback time.

“The CDF then asked me whether during my visit to Blue Roof, I had seen Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere. I simply answered that I had seen them,” he says.

Given Chiwenga’s intelligence assets at Mugabe’s house and that he was in charge of the situation, Bonyongwe notes that he could not lie about that.

“As I left, I saw Shiri who had arrived from Dubai. I greeted him and he responded awkwardly,” he points out. That, Bonyongwe notes, was a clear signal Shiri, a Mugabe relative from the Chikerema clan, had abandoned his commander-in-chief and was with his coup colleagues. On his way out of KGVI, Bonyongwe met Major-General Engelbert Rugeje, but did not discuss anything and Tapfumaneyi went to leave him at Sam Levy to take his car home.

On 19 November, Bonyongwe indicates a senior government official who cannot be named for security reasons called and met him for breakfast.

He told him someone from the generals had visited and told him that he should slow down his activities as the army was getting increasingly agitated with him and he could face something worse than the attack on Shiri on 13 December 2008 when he was assailed in what was viewed as a botched assassination attempt.

Bonyongwe could relate to that as his car, Toyota Land Cruiser, which was being used by his wife, had in 2009 had front wheel nuts removed and loosened in a dirty play plot against him to cause an accident.

Lucky enough for Bonyongwe, he had already seen the commanders and explained himself — assured them that he was not planning a counter.

The same day, 19 November, Bonyongwe got a call from Blue Roof inviting him for a meeting at State House. On rival, he found the mediation team and Sibanda.

The crucial meeting was to discuss a document written by the army containing their long list of grievances.

Before the meeting started, Bonyongwe told Mugabe that Chiwenga had asked him after their meeting if he had seen Moyo and Kasukuwere, and he had told him the truth: Yes.

He says he told Mugabe because he did not want him to be caught by surprise if Chiwenga raised the issue with him.

They also spoke about the Zanu PF Central Committee meeting which was being organised to expel G40 leaders from the party, including Mugabe and his wife Grace.

The meeting also installed Mnangagwa as Zanu PF, paving a way for his return from South Africa on 23 November.

Mugabe lamented the unacceptable behaviour of some agitators against him such as Patrick Chinamasa and Obert Mpofu.

Mugabe described Chinamasa as a “coward” who did not join the war in Mozambique, as he remained at university and later practicing law after that instead.

He said Chinamasa only had the courage to go to Jongwe Building — Zanu PF headquarters in Harare — and pose as a “revolutionary” fighting those who had actually fought Ian Smith in the struggle.

The late president also lambasted Mpofu, who had previously described himself as Mugabe’s “ever obedient son”.

The generals — Chiwenga and others — arrived at State House accompanied by Shiri and police commissioner-general Augustine Chihuri, a G40 kingpin.

The meeting looked into the document by the military and the possible solutions. It also dealt with fears of a counter and that the Joint Operations Command system had become dysfunctional due to the coup.

“The floor was opened and a general discussion ensued. Commissioner-General Chihuri stated that he wanted to dispel any idea that he wanted to arrest CDF Chiwenga when he returned from China, and he thanked the generals for ensuring that the coup had taken place peacefully,” Bonyongwe says.

“The CDF (again) then asked about the whereabouts of Moyo and Kasukuwere, and said he wanted them taken into custody. The president replied that he was only keeping their families at his home and that he had asked the two ministers to leave; indeed, for all he knew, they have taken sanctuary at one or another embassy. He did not push the issue.”

Even when things were bad, Chiwenga continued to behave in a dignified way just like Mugabe himself, so a confrontation was avoided over Moyo and Kasukuwere.

Bonyongwe said the army grievances were abandoned as the discussion shifted to blaming him for wrongly advising the president. Although Mukonori said Bonyongwe and his ministry had helped the situation, the former CIO boss was blamed for many things happening and he was agitated.

In response, Bonyongwe wrote a long document and gave it to Chiwenga during Mnangagwa’s inauguration on 24 November 2017.

Bonyongwe also gave Mnangagwa the same document when they met in his office on 29 November when he was already president.

The main issue there was that Bonyongwe was trying to use the air force and police to attack the generals and counter the coup, something the Mnangagwa faction believed strongly.

Says Bonyongwe: “I had no death wish. I knew that only an army would be able to stop another army and I did not have one at my disposal, even if I wanted to stop the coup.”

The former CIO boss says he was baffled why people blamed him for the reaction of intelligence service to the coup when he was no longer there.

After some discussions, the meeting at State House decided on the way forward which was that Mugabe would address the nation for the first time since the coup.

Nhepera, Sibanda, Charamba and Bonyongwe were tasked to put together the speech.

Charamba took the lead. Before the generals left State House, Bonyongwe took Chiwenga aside and asked what he really wanted from the coup. Chiwenga stressed that Zanu PF’s future had to be decided at the extraordinary congress the following month, so that became the focus of the speech.

Bonyongwe says at the point he realised that Chiwenga did not have big issues with Mugabe.

He was flexible, although the young turks were edgy about that.

That evening, 19 November, the generals were back at State House for Mugabe’s address which was agreed before that by all stakeholders.

That was the infamous “Asante Sana” speech, which turned out to be scam for ordinary people who wanted Mugabe to go immediately. Bonyongwe notes the speech caused controversy

with some people claiming Mugabe had read a  wrong one or it was edited.

The situation was worsened by some pages falling and Chiwenga pick them up for him.

The issue of Bonyongwe’s relationship with army commanders came up again as Charamba told him the army was not happy with him.

After that, Bonyongwe went to his ministry on 20 November to focus on parliamentary business and related issues, particularly cabinet meeting on 21 November and the budget scheduled for 23 November.

Bonyongwe worked with Sibanda and Finance permanent secretary Willard Manungo on the budget. Chinamasa had been roped in to take charge of the budget as Chombo was in detention.

In the process, Bonyongwe engaged Speaker of Parliament Jacob Mudenda who told him he had been away and was in the dark.

Indeed, The NewsHawks knows that Mudenda was in Namibia at the time. Mudenda told Bonyongwe he would not support impeachment against Mugabe. After all, the opposition MDC had in 2016 tried and failed to impeach Mugabe.

While Bonyongwe was talking to Mudenda in parliament on 20 November, Chris Mutsvangwa had walked in, but said nothing and left.

Bonyongwe then explains at length his bad relations with Mutsvangwa and why he is hostile to him. As Bonyongwe was leaving parliament, he met Temba Mliswa, then independent Norton

MP who advised him that he should not rescue Grace Mugabe as she had been shouting at him.

Bonyongwe and Mliswa knew each other well at the gym where they trained together.

While that happened, hostility against Bonyongwe intensified as some Zanu PF officials thought he had met Mudenda to try to block Mugabe’s impeachment. There was a lot of misinformation circulating.

However, the former CIO guru says he never had a mission to canvass support for Mugabe against generals. His mission was to manage the situation. Back in his office, Bonyongwe briefed

Sibanda about the way forward. He also briefed Mugabe about the situation.

In the evening that day, Bonyongwe received a call from Mugabe telling him that Moyo and Kasukuwere had left and were now in Mozambique.

Within 10 minutes, Chiwenga called asking Bonyongwe what was the situation regarding the “two fugitives”.

“I told him exactly what the president had told me (they have left) and the matter ended there,” he said.

On 21 November, Bonyongwe was alerted to fliers by some war veterans who were denouncing him for alleging he was trying to block Mugabe’s impeachment. He tried to get a lawyer Jonathan Samukange to sue them, but dropped the plan later.

On the same day, Sibanda had called Bonyongwe just before 8am to attend a cabinet meeting at State House at 9am. He had to attend the meeting as Leader of Government Business in Parliament.

But only Mike Bimha, Joseph Made, Walter Chidhakwa and Samuel Undenge turned up.

Sibanda and Machaya were also there. Sekeramayi, who had joined Gono on the mediation team, had gone to Blue Roof.

The cabinet meeting at State House did not take place as most ministers were at the Zanu

PF party caucus meeting at 2pm to agree on impeachment and would then reconvene at 4pm at Harare International Conference Centre, Rainbow Towers Hotel.

Mugabe was facing four charges: Serious misconduct; failure to obey, uphold and defend the constitution; wilful violation of the constitution; and inability to perform his office’s functions due to physical and mental incapacity.

The impeachment process was to be completed by 23 November, a day before Mnangagwa was sworn, which means Mugabe would not even be given the right of reply or an opportunity to answer the allegations.

While waiting for the 2pm party caucus meeting on impeachment, Sibanda called Bonyongwe at 1pm, saying Mugabe wanted him to come to his residence urgently. “When I put my phone down, the President called.

He asked me to find a lawyer and report to him at Blue Roof immediately,” he says.

Sibanda had already contacted Bonyongwe on the same issue, meaning Mugabe had spoken to Sibanda before that.

Bonyongwe contacted Machaya and together with Sibanda they went to Blue Roof.

On arrival, they joined a meeting already underway between Mugabe, Grace and the mediation team, which included Sekeramayi, Gono, Mukonori and Charamba.

Mugabe dropped the bombshell: I have decided to resign.

That was after 37 years in power and 40 years at the helm of Zanu PF. Everyone was relieved, but there was still a problem and uncertainty.

Mudenda said he was not going to stop impeachment proceedings underway until Mugabe’s resignation letter had arrived.

Machaya, Sibanda and Charamba had been tasked by the meeting to draft the letter, while Sekeramayi and Bonyongwe went to HICC to manage the situation at the stormy impeachment proceedings.

Bonyongwe was to handle the process. As he stepped up to the front to engage Mudenda who was presiding, Bonyongwe was booed and heckled. Zanu PF legislators did not know Mugabe had already resigned.

Some Zanu PF MPs even refused to allow Bonyongwe to sit next to them during the proceedings, particularly Monica Mutsvangwa whom Bonyongwe says did a “good job in vilifying Mugabe”.

After a chaotic situation, Bonyongwe got the letter delivered from Machaya and handed it over to Mudenda who then read it to the anxious lawmakers. “The Speaker took the letter and read it out to a thunderous applause.

The era of Robert Gabriel Mugabe was over!”