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Analysis

Zim’s military reorientation politics: View from barrack

THE military not only focuses on mobilising and threatening civilians to support ZANU-PF, it also intimidates and victimises junior soldiers who do not publicly support ZANU-PF.

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GODFREY MARINGIRA

THE military not only focuses on mobilising and threatening civilians to support ZANU-PF, it also intimidates and victimises junior soldiers who do not publicly support ZANU-PF.

In the aftermath of the DRC war, from 2003, army commanders politicised junior soldiers on the centrality of the military to ZANU-PF politics.

The existence of politics within army barracks is crucial to our understanding of the ways in which the military continues to produce spaces for the political mobilisation of soldiers.

It is never easy to ensure the loyalty of junior soldiers to political and military elites.

Army commanders and generals had to work in and beyond the barracks to politicise junior soldiers.

In this regard, the politics of the barracks determines how the army acts at election times and beyond.

Hence, barracks are not only spaces of work but of politics as well, with army commanders the custodians of such politics.

In 1986, the new Zimbabwe army engaged in the mass recruitment of soldiers, especially those who had no experience of the liberation war (Young 1997).

The idea was partly to integrate a new generation of soldiers with no political allegiances into the military and for these soldiers to work alongside and later replace an old generation of former guerrillas (ibid.).

The latter is yet to happen (Maringira 2017).

Importantly, the newly recruited soldiers formed what was popularly known as the 6th Brigade, which was later deployed to Mozambique to fight against RENAMO between 1986 and 1992.

In the early 1990s, the ZNA became involved in peace operations in Angola and Somalia, which legitimised its recruitment drive. Involvement in the DRC war also saw the mass recruitment of soldiers.

Afterwards, Zimbabwe was in a political and economic crisis due to the fast-track land reform programme, in which the army was also involved (Chaumba, Scoones, and Woolmer 2003), perpetrating violence against white commercial farmers (Sachikonye 2011).

From 2003, the Zimbabwe army commanders worked hard to politicise junior soldiers, particularly those who did not participate in the liberation struggle.

It was never a given for all soldiers to understand or be interested in politics. In response, junior soldiers began to desert in large numbers, citing an increase in political victimisation by the war veterans who were still serving in the army (Maringira 2017).

Senior army officers led the programme to re-educate soldiers on politics.

The Military Intelligence Director, then Lieutenant Colonel, now Brigadier Morgan Mzilikazi, the adviser on defence to the Zimbabwe Embassy in China, and Military Police Director, then Lieutenant Colonel, now Brigadier and Presidential Brigade Commander Fidelis Mhonda, embarked on a barracks tour and visited every battalion and squadron to reorient soldiers to ZANU-PF politics and what the politics of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by Morgan Tsvangirai, meant to the army.

In his address, which was held in the troops’ canteen at one of the infantry battalions, Brigadier Mzilikazi asked soldiers to relax.

He greeted them with a song, Zimbabwe Nyika yedu yaBaba … Zimbabwe Nyika yedu yeMadzitateguru (‘Zimbabwe is our country which belongs to our Fathers … Zimbabwe is for our Ancestors’).

This was about the entitlement of Zimbabwe and belonging to Zimbabwe.

It was about exclusion of the ‘Other’ in politics.

Those who were not born of our Madzitateguru (ancestors) were simply not deemed to belong to Zimbabwe.

Mzilikazi went on to state that ‘there was nothing wrong with the MDC and Morgan Tsvangirai, but what they do, conniving with the West is what is wrong’.

The room was quiet; he tried unsuccessfully to crack some jokes.

It was a tense moment for soldiers who were being addressed by the Military Intelligence Director for the first time.

Brigadier Mzilikazi further noted that, ‘we know those who support the MDC here’. Soldiers looked at each other in horror.

In the barracks, it was generally considered subversion for soldiers to support an opposition political party, in particular the MDC and its leaders.

The former soldiers interviewed suggested that if the military intelligence just suspected that a soldier supported or sympathised with the MDC or Morgan Tsvangirai, that was enough to dismiss the soldier with ignominy, and without pension and service benefits.

From the interviews, many soldiers faced such consequences.

In one election, two second lieutenants were dismissed after it was thought that they were happy in the officers’ mess when the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was announcing election results in which ZANU-PF was losing by a wider margin in some constituencies. Dismissal from the military was in itself a political weapon used by the army generals in sustaining ZANU-PF and President Mugabe in power.

Most junior ranked soldiers were affected by what they referred to as ‘barrack politics’ which victimises soldiers.

They were intimidated when it was time to vote in national elections. As noted by Sierra Tango, if ‘you voted otherwise [than ZANU-PF] you would find yourself in prison, so you cannot say that soldiers were expressing their wishes’.

Senior army officers, those aligned with ZANU-PF, ordered the arrest and detention of soldiers. What was interesting is that soldiers were imprisoned in detention barracks, and not civilian prisons. Detention barracks are politicised spaces characterised by military punishment, which is meant to reform soldiers to understand that politics was all about supporting ZANU-PF.

During these exercises, detained soldiers are reminded that punishment is for those who support opposition political parties.

While junior soldiers were arrested and detained within the barracks, war veterans, especially those who had fought in the liberation struggle against British colonialism, were promoted despite not having taken any military courses according to their regiment files.

This was noted by Bravo Charlie: ‘For war veterans there were rampant promotions.

There was a signal that all war veterans in the army must be promoted one rank … with immediate effect.

This was despite that they were not skilled in that [higher] rank.’

The issue here is that war veterans who were still serving in the military were supporters of ZANU-PF.

Their promotion was a political reward. Most war veterans even became commissioned officers.

They were made to attend the Basic Officers’ Cadet course after a few weeks of training.

The professionalism of military was undermined by the ZANU-PF politics of rewarding ZANLA veterans.

While some soldiers resigned from the military, interestingly, others deserted. In both cases, the reasons were mainly because of the party politics which had infiltrated the barracks. Soldiers could not bear it anymore.

I deserted because of politics.

I was viewed as an MDC … party supporter.

I was then targeted on military parades.

I was always punished for an offence I had not committed.

I tried to resign, but every day I was punished and sometimes detained in the barracks by the regimental police. NU-PF, ordered the arrest and detention of soldiers.

What was interesting is that soldiers were imprisoned in detention barracks, and not civilian prisons.

Detention barracks are politicised spaces characterised by military punishment, which is meant to reform soldiers to understand that politics was all about supporting ZANU-PF.

During these exercises, detained soldiers are reminded that punishment is for those who support opposition political parties.

While junior soldiers were arrested and detained within the barracks, war veterans, especially those who had fought in the liberation struggle against British colonialism, were promoted despite not having taken any military courses according to their regiment files.

This was noted by Bravo Charlie: ‘For war veterans there were rampant promotions.

There was a signal that all war veterans in the army must be promoted one rank … with immediate effect.

This was despite that they were not skilled in that [higher] rank.’

The issue here is that war veterans who were still serving in the military were supporters of ZANU-PF.

Their promotion was a political reward. Most war veterans even became commissioned officers.

They were made to attend the Basic Officers’ Cadet course after a few weeks of training.

The professionalism of military was undermined by the ZANU-PF politics of rewarding ZANLA veterans.

While some soldiers resigned from the military,

T hese desertions were centred on the politicisation of the barracks spaces and the military.

In an ideal military camp, military parades are professional spaces, where soldiers practice drills to enhance discipline and institute social cohesiveness (Hockey 2002).

It is also a space where military briefings are held.

However, the use of military parades as centres of political power reveals how the military had been politicised and how ZANU-PF’s support base has been dwindling in and beyond the barracks.

The military generals employed and utilised political resources to sustain ZANU-PF in power.

(This is an extract from a research paper titled: T he military in zimbabwean politics published in May 2024.)

*About the writer: Godfrey Maringira is an Associate Professor of Anthropology at Sol Plaatje University, Kimberley, South Africa.

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